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 THE IMPERATIVE OF NATURAL RIGHTS IN TODAY’S WORLD 
 
 Randy E. Barnett 
 
 If there is any group that really needs to understand the concept of natural 
rights, it is professors of constitutional law.  The document they teach was written 
by a generation who uniformly believed in natural rights, used the concept to 
justify a violent revolution from their mother country, and professed their 
continued commitment to natural rights long after the separation—a commitment 
that only intensified in the years that culminated in the Civil War and the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Natural rights are enshrined in the text of the 
Constitution in at least two places.  First, there is the Ninth Amendment that 
reads, “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage other retained by the people.”  Upon the evidence 
there can be no doubt that the rights “retained by the people” are natural liberty 
rights.  The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in part, “No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States. . . .”  The great weight of the historical evidence supports the conclusion 
that, in addition to certain positive rights of U.S. citizenship included in the Bill of 
Rights and other laws, “privileges or immunities” refers to natural retained liberty 
rights. 
 Yet few constitutional law professors know much, if anything, about this 
fundamental concept even as a historical matter, much less as a concept worthy of 
continued application in today’s world.  The prime evidence of their lack of 
knowledge is the fact that they use the terms “natural rights” and “natural law” 
interchangeably despite the historical and theoretical distinctness of these terms.  
For one thing, natural law is a much older notion than natural rights, but I will not 
dwell here on the intellectual history of these concepts.  Nor will I attempt to do 
justice to the multiple variations on these concepts among philosophers.  Instead, I 
will provide what I hope will be viewed as a readily accessible explication of 
these concepts that has as much practical application today as it did in the days of 
John Locke or James Madison.  Although this is decidedly my take on natural law 
and natural rights, I think it is true to the heart of the concept and can be used to 
make sense of historical materials that are otherwise inexplicable to modern 
constitutional scholars.  And this vision of natural rights is as important today as it 
was in 1776 or 1868. 
 Let me begin by stressing what natural law and natural rights share in 
common: a basic methodology.  Both natural law and natural rights are what may 
be called normative disciplines, by which I mean intellectual constructs used to 
assess how human beings ought to act in pursuit of their objectives.  Both employ 
a “given-if-then” analysis of the following sort  Given the nature of X, if you want 
to achieve Y, then you ought to do Z.  Modern philosophers know this form of 
reasoning as a hypothetical imperative.  While their method relies upon the nature 
both of human beings and of the world—a knowledge of which is informed by 
physical and other empirical sciences—natural law and natural rights theorists use 
this “value free” information in the service of human aspirations and goals, 
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thereby combining (though not collapsing) the “is” with an “ought.”  (Though 
many versions of natural law theory also locate the goal or Y in the nature or end 
of human beings, the account presented here takes no stance on this further 
teleological claim.) 
 So understood, the natural law mode of reasoning can be seen as pervasive 
in human life.  For example, it pervades the normative disciplines of agriculture, 
architecture, engineering, and medicine.  These disciplines are normative in the 
sense that they instruct and guide human conduct by telling us how we ought to 
act.  Each builds upon the knowledge conferred by the theoretical sciences, as 
well as on practical knowledge, to address their respective subjects:  given the 
nature of human beings and the world in which we live, if you want to grow 
edible crops/build habitable dwellings/construct usable machines/heal the sick, 
then you ought to do Z.  Of course, the answers given in Z will vary with the 
discipline.   
 This makes the imperatives within these disciplines dependent on a 
commitment to their respective ends.  The imperatives of medicine depend upon 
caring about making people well.  The imperatives of agriculture depend on 
caring about producing nutritious food for human consumption.  Should anyone 
question these ends, some other arguments need to be advanced in response 
(hence the further teleological claims of some natural law theories).  But 
assuming a common concern for the ends of these disciplines, the principles they 
teach are as imperative as any principles ever are.  
 Another feature shared by natural law and natural rights analyses—and 
what makes it accurate to call these analyses “natural”—is the content of the X: 
the nature of human beings and the world in which we live.    Both methods of 
analysis abstract from the contingencies of particular persons and circumstances 
to identify what persons have in common as persons, including the common 
problems of social life, to reach general normative conclusions about action 
guiding rules and principles.   
 So both natural law and natural rights analyses employ the reasoning:  
given the nature of human beings and the world in which human beings live and 
interact, if you want to accomplish Y, then you ought to respect principles Z.  
True, if the nature of human beings and the world are “contingent” in the sense 
that they could have been otherwise, then the principles yielded by natural law 
reasoning are contingent in this sense as well.  But so long as the world is as it is 
(and cannot be changed by human fiat or engineering) then the principles remain 
fixed as well.   
 Of course the principles yielded by a natural law or rights analysis are not 
to be found in nature. They are human concepts or “constructs,” but neither are 
they arbitrary extensions of human will.  If not well-grounded in the real world, 
they will fail to perform their vital action-guiding function.  That these principles 
are human “constructs” no more deprecates their functional importance, and 
nonarbitrary nature, than does the constructed nature of the concepts and 
principles of agriculture, engineering, architecture, and medicine.   
 What differentiates natural law from natural rights is what goes in the Y.  
Natural law and natural rights apply the same basic method of analysis to two 
distinct and different (though possibly related) questions.  Natural law addresses 
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the problem of how we as people ought to live our lives.  So natural law addresses 
the question:  given the nature of human beings and the world in which we live, if 
you want to be happy or live a good life, you ought to do Z.  Those general 
principles to which you ought to adhere are called virtues, those general 
categories of actions you ought not do are called vices.  On the other hand, one 
could also consider “natural law” to be a broader umbrella term to refer to all 
normative disciplines based on the nature of human beings, while the problem of  
life well is addressed by natural law ethics, but this is merely a semantic choice. 
 In contrast, the subject of natural rights attempts to discern how human 
social interactions should be structured so as to facilitate the pursuit of human 
happiness.  So natural rights addresses the question:  given the nature of human 
beings and the world in which we live, if you want a society in which persons 
may pursue happiness while living in close proximity to others, then you ought to 
do Z.  What you ought to do (Z) is properly define and respect the natural rights 
or liberties that enable persons to pursue happiness without interfering with the 
like pursuit of others with whom they interact.  What you ought not do is violate 
these properly defined rights.  The connection between these two disciplines is 
obvious: the pursuit of human happiness or the good life, but the problems they 
address are quite different  Handling these distinct problems require the emphasis 
of different facts (in the X), and the conclusions reached by each mode of analysis 
are as different as the conclusions reached by architecture and agriculture. 
 The purpose of engaging in any of these normative disciplines is to guide 
human conduct in highly complex world—a world too complex to understand or 
manipulate or navigate without the use of abstractions.  Not any abstractions will 
do, however.  At root they must be grounded on the salient facts of human 
existence.  But these facts must be selected and honed to reveal the patterns on 
which decisions can be made.   In short, abstractions must be chosen that reveal 
the order, both obvious and hidden, that lies in human nature and the world in 
which humans live.   
 In previous eras, this order was universally thought to have been created 
by God.  Many believe this even today, or say they do.  Thus a discipline like 
natural law or natural rights was though by its adherents to be based on something 
divine, just as were the disciplines of medicine, agriculture, and engineering.  But 
the authority of natural law and natural rights did not stem from any divine fiat or 
will—from any sort of “divine positivism.”  Rather, the wisdom revealed by 
natural law and natural rights analyses turned on the order in the world from 
which generalizations can be made, and it does not really matter to this analysis 
where this order came from.   
 So it is a serious intellectual error, though one that is all to common, to 
associate natural law or natural rights with God or with divine will.  Indeed, even 
natural law theorists such as Aquinas distinguished between divine law which is 
based on the command of God and revealed in scriptures by God’s word, and 
natural law which is based in the order in the universe and is discovered by 
human reason.  In contrast, human law was defined as the commands of human 
authorities and, where these commands do not directly reflect natural law, their 
imperatives must be promulgated. 
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 It is completely inaccurate and unfair, not to mention ungenerous, to 
characterize natural rights theories as reflecting something called “atomistic 
individualism.”  That term is meant to connote a view of persons as radically 
separated from each other and immune from the effects of others.  I know of no 
natural rights thinker who fits this description and, if you stop to think about it, no 
one is ever named by those who make this charge.  Or if someone is named, no 
quotations are provided to substantiate this description.   
 To the contrary, the whole point of a natural rights analysis is to address 
the problem of human vulnerability and interconnectedness.  No one person is 
strong or independent enough to pursue happiness in the face of concerted 
opposition from the masses or from a concerted handful of other people—or from 
even a single obsessed or evil individual.   Natural rights attempts to identify 
conceptually the space within which vulnerable people need to be free to make 
their own choices about the directions of their lives, which includes crucially the 
choices of how to acquire, use, and dispose of scarce physical resources.   Once 
these rights are identified, it a somewhat but not entirely separate matter of 
institutional design to see how they can best be protected in a world in which 
others are more than willing, if given half a chance, to interfere with the well 
being of others.   
 Natural rights, therefore, do not enforce themselves.  They are rather a 
mode of normative analysis used to evaluate and critique the positive law that is 
needed to reinforce them.  But nevertheless, if they are correctly formulated, there 
are real world consequences for violating these rights.  Human wellbeing will 
suffer and die.  No society will survive as a society if these principles are 
disregarded completely.  But they may be respected more or less fully and the 
welfare of those who inhabit a particular regime will prosper or suffer 
accordingly.  If empirical demonstrations of the efficacy of particular 
formulations of natural rights is desired beyond the appeal of rational argument, 
then it may be found in comparisons between those societies who better protect 
these rights with those in which such rights are neglected.  At the extreme, the 
ultimate empirical test is watching the direction the refugees flee. 
 Both natural law and natural rights, however, have their limits that are not 
always acknowledged by their adherents.  Based as they are on generalizations 
from the particularities of a highly complex world, the principles they yield are 
quite abstract—too abstract, indeed, to be applied deductively to any but the most 
obvious of situations.  Natural law reveals abstract insights into vice and virtue 
but the most thoughtful natural law theorists acknowledge that putting these 
principles into practice takes judgment, an undefinable “practical wisdom”; that 
living well is an art, not an empirical science.   
 So too with natural rights.  Natural rights analysis can identify the 
fundamental liberties that all human beings require to pursue happiness while 
living in close proximity to others—the rights of several property, freedom of 
contract, first possession, self defense, and restitution.  But there is no unique 
demonstrably correct way of applying these abstract rights to all but the most 
simple of real world situations.  Lawyers are well aware of just how incredibly 
complex real world situations can become.  The abstractions of natural rights 
provide easy answers to very few of the vexatious problems that confront even 
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first year law students in property, torts, and contracts.  Although, to be fair, the 
cases studied there are deliberately chosen to test the margins of our intuitions on 
what differentiates liberty from license. 
 While respect for properly formulated natural rights is necessary for a 
well-functioning social order, it is not sufficient.  There must also exist some 
method for applying these abstract rights to the complexities of human life so that 
human beings can conform their conduct to the requirements of justice.  The 
injunctions of natural rights must assume an understandable form.   This distinct 
but related endeavor is known as “the rule of law.”  What is needed are 
discernable doctrines or practices by which people can order their conduct 
towards others and upon which they can rely in making their plans for the future.   
Such rules are conventional in the sense that there is no one right set of rules that 
will accomplish this end.  These rules will vary with the particular circumstances 
of different societies.  They need to be determined by agreement or otherwise.  
And so long as they do not stray outside the frame provided by abstract natural 
rights, they can reflect other imperatives such as the ends of fairness and 
efficiency. 
 Still, properly formulated natural rights remain a guide to the outer 
boundaries beyond which conventional rules of law should not extend.  Natural 
rights prevent a completely open-ended experimentation with rules of law.  They 
provide guidance that avoids catastrophic results without having to experience 
them.  In sum, natural rights not only point the way to the achievement of what 
Hayek called the Great Society in which diverse human beings living within 
distinctive communities can flourish.  They also prevent the infinite routes to 
tyranny and human misery that has been the norm, rather than the exception, of 
history.  Social experimentation that immiserates millions need not be tried to be 
avoided if natural rights are understood and respected.   
 Therefore, while it is not absolutely necessary to understand the concept of 
natural rights to achieve the Great Society, it certainly helps.  If nothing else it 
cautions intellectuals against succumbing to their natural hubris when, from the 
comfort of their parlors, they urge others to destroy the institutions that instantiate 
the principles that make social order and human flourishing possible. 
____________________________________ 
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